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THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE UNITED 







The objective of this work is to analyze the participation of the United States of 
America in the restructuring of the Argentinean debt after the December 2001 
crisis. Most part of studies and researches on the situation faced by the Latin 
American country is focused on unraveling the economic causes and 
mechanisms that led this country to declare the greatest suspension of debt 
disbursements of its history. There are many points of view and debates based 
on this focus. In our case, the perspective is different. We consider that the U.S. 
had much more to do with the Argentinean meltdown and its resolution. 
 During the 1990s, the U.S. had flattered Argentina for its economic 
conduct inspired by the Washington Consensus. However, this praise fell apart 
when the American economy entered recession in 2000. Starting from this 
moment, the discourse and actions, especially after George Walker Bush took 
office, were centered on leaving Argentina to chance considering the country as 
the sole responsible for its own financial crisis. In this sense, it was an 
unfavorable external scenario for Argentina, and its dependence on the U.S. was 
flagrant. The dependence was so important that when the U.S. administration 
left its indifference behind and decided to be an active part of the narrowing of 
the default, playing a strong and plain role of political force, the Latin 
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American country was able to recover its economic situation. It coincided with 




A Dysfunctional Intention 
Argentina, as most part of Latin America, has a structural dependence on U.S. 
based mainly on the strategic-military dimension, which was very evident 
during the Cold War and reverberated on the economic-commercial and 
political-diplomatic dimensions. This structural dependence endured the 
globalization era and, amongst other questions, took its toll in the financial 
level through the U.S. or an interposition of the multilateral channels of credit. 
In the Argentinean case, the aforementioned dependence was strongly enforced 
by the political alignment between Buenos Aires and Washington, boosted after 
1989 by the Carlos Menem administrations. Menem’s successor and rival, 
Fernando de la Rúa, was not able to get rid of this dependence and his run 
ended during the 2001 crisis2. 
 The Argentinean default of 2002 was not a subject related to the 
strategic-military plan. It was comfortable for the U.S. to appeal to the rule 
that affirms that each question or thematic area must be solved according to its 
own logic, independently of political rationality. In this sense, it was understood 
that the problem of Argentinean debt should be solved through financial 
methods3. Except for the distances, it was a kind of emulation similar to the 
attitude adopted by Great Britain in 1890. Back then, the British government 
denied political interference to finish the Argentinean crisis of the Baring 
Brothers Bank, when some interventionists of London demanded Robert 
Gascoyne-Cecil (Marquees of Salisbury) administration a state action in the 
                                                 
2 The Argentinean 2001 crisis had its political and institutional features, but it was primarily financial. It 
was felt in what was called “the crisis periphery”, that is to say, emerging economies that absorbed the 
volatility of determined capital fluxes originated by other countries of similar condition, and it was the 
problem’s epicenter. See Jadresic, Schmidt-Hebbel and Valdés, “Crisis financieras internacionales, 
prestamista de última instancia y nueva arquitectura financiera internacional,” 359-391. 
3 According to Jim Saxton (2003), from U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee (JEC), Argentina 
entered recession in 1998 and it was facing  in the end of 2001 it was facing “authentic depression”. It 
was due to “poor economic policies that converted a common recession into depression”.   





Latin American country. The Foreign Office neutralized these demands 
pointing out that the problem between Baring and Argentina should not be 
solved through political means, but through the rules afforded by the financial 
logic. 
 The U.S. had recurred to the aforementioned rule, not only because of 
its complicity with the Argentinean meltdown, but also because of its very own 
mid-2000 economic crisis that resulted in a recession, after many years of 
bonanza. It was not an entanglement of magnitude comparable to the 1974 or 
1981 crisis. Nonetheless, three quarters with negative growth were registered, 
affecting the international financial system4. The economy had over-expanded 
itself, there was an undetermined growth of the ICT industry and corruption 
seized big corporations like energy company Enron Corporation or the 
telecommunication enterprise WorldCom, which went bankrupt5. The American 
crisis was the rupture of the 1990s power alliance between Argentina and the 
U.S.’ key feature6. In this context, the international conjuncture became 
adverse for Argentina, and the hegemon’s indifference concerning the critical 
situation that affected the Latin American country was a more than sufficient 
display7. 
 However, once the American administration reoriented its economy, it 
changed its attitude towards Argentina. It fathomed the high international 
vulnerability of this country. Nevertheless, Washington was not specifically 
interested in Argentina’s destiny, but in hemispherical stability. The Latin 
American state’s crisis was thereby analyzed through strategic lenses in order to 
both preserve the U.S. geopolitical interests in the region and blockade an 
inception of disaster in the world economic system. The initially intended rule 
                                                 
4 According to Alicia Girón (2002), the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 “fastened the uncertainty process not 
only in the United States, but in the international financial market”, joining the global economic 
recession. 
5 During the 2000 crisis, one must also consider the vertical fall of interest rates. See Gutiérrez, “El papel 
de la industria de las TIC: recesión y recuperación en Estados Unidos y México,” 45-77. 
6 Like affirmed by Guillermo Calvo (2009), in a certain way there was a “financial contagion”, which is 
the “most common mechanism through which a local contingency turns into a global or systemic 
crisis”.   
7 Argentina, like Brazil, was a highly indebted country. It was not casual that the American recessive 
crisis took its toll in the economies of countries that, according to Roberto Frenkel (2008), were in 
“financial snare, with high country risk taxes, slow growth and huge external financial fragility”.   
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that affirmed that each question or thematic area should be solved according to 
its own logic was consequently broken. To leave the indifference firstly 
propelled to the Argentinean case aside and to subordinate the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to its own objectives was fundamental. One more time 
Argentina felt the vigor of the dependence on the U.S., as it happened when 
enduring the effects of the North American recessive crises just to be assisted by 
Washington due to its strategic needs. 
 
 
The change of the American decision 
The American participation of the negotiations related to the external debt of 
Argentina started when the White House decided to oppose what was sustained 
by the Secretary of the Treasure, Paul O’Neill. The secretary had affirmed that 
the aforementioned negotiation should befall between the indebted country and 
IMF, under technical criteria and without political intromission. In order 
words, a debate within the financial rationale. O’Neill’s aim was to tear U.S. 
apart from the Argentinean case foisting the responsibility to solve the case to 
IMF because of Washington’s responsibility for the development of the 2001 
crisis in the Latin American country, among other reasons – like aforestated. 
Hence, O’Neill vetoed the Argentinean Minister of Economy’s proposal to 
justify the restructuring of the debt deadlines through political criteria. The 
minister was Jorge Remes Lenicov. 
 O’Neill’s ground zero was not easy to achieve. IMF was divided 
between opinions on the Argentinean case. Some clerks of the international fund 
echoed the opinion of the influent economist Rudiger Dornbusch, who affirmed 
that IMF should “intervene” in the economic conduction of Argentina due to its 
institutions’ weaknesses. At the same time, other IMF officials aligned with the 
ideas of Fernando Losada, from the New Yorker ABN Amro Bank, who relished 
the possibility of lending Buenos Aires the necessary amount for it not to 
deepen its default. In spite of these positions, O’Neill relied on a very important 
ally, Anne Krueger, IMF first deputy managing director. With similar goals to 
O’Neill’s, Krueger wanted to overshadow the role played by IMF in Argentina’s 
indebtedness, conceding Buenos Aires total responsibility for the halt of 





payments. For these reasons, parallel to O’Neill, she wanted a strictly technical 
negotiation, without any political transactions. 
    Krueger’s position in favor of a technical negotiation, added to the 
stubbornness of Remes Lenicov, betting in a political agreement, meant that 
the relation between Argentina and IMF had entered a paralysis with no return 
(Torres 2010, 88). From this moment, the White House was rippled by concern 
not because of the economic and political future of Argentina, but because of 
the possibility that its default could affect the regional and provoke unpleasant 
international consequences. As Eduardo Duhalde, president of Argentina at 
that point, was not well regarded by Washington, Bush decided to change 
O’Neill’s official position on the Argentina’s debt deadlines. It was an 
important shift, since the U.S. opted to conduct the negotiation between 
Argentina and IMF in order to avoid greater damages. It implied ignoring 
Remes Lenicov’s attitude, putting Duhalde on the backburner and supporting 
the appointment of Roberto Lavagna as Minister of Economy, in whom 
Washington trusted to reach a satisfactory conclusion. 
 The U.S. administration, echoing the strong pressure made by 
international bankers, imposed as a primary condition the derogation of the 
Economic Subversion Law for Argentina, which was successfully achieved8. The 
brokers based themselves on the rationale that this act impeded the functioning 
of the national financial system according to the international rules. Such 
bankers obviously relied on IMF bureaucrats that, on the other hand, claimed 
the deprecation of the aforementioned decree since it caused juridical insecurity 
for investments. In fact, both banks and IMF aimed covering the complicity 
they had during the halt of payments mainly through “financial shielding” 
actions, the so-called “megaswap” for postponement of debt deadlines and other 
                                                 
8 The Economic Subversion Law was from 1974 and broadly stipulated sanctions for people who 
economically damaged the country. In 2002 some judges applied this act to prosecute bankers for the 
so-called “financial play yard”. The government also had to reform the Bankruptcy Act that, by 
preaching productive and creditworthiness emergency, was able to readjust debtors and the debt of the 
private sector. On the other hand, it had to close the fiscal agreement with main provinces, since it was 
one of the requirements made by IMF. It is also worth to mention that sectors of the Argentinean 
entrepreneurship supported the derogation of the Economic Subversion Law, arguing that it impeded 
the procurement for credits of the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank. 
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actions that ended up structurally damaging the country’s economy instead of 
stabilizing it. 
 The American participation in the negotiations was not only based in 
the Argentinean compliance with abolishing the Economic Subversion Law. It 
was also because Duhalde promised to call elections in order to avoid an 
extension of his interim tenure, which was fulfilled. Further, the 
aforementioned support was possible for other reasons. One of them was the 
White House decision to tear O’Neill apart from the Argentinean case. A second 
one was the improvement in the commercial and diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Buenos Aires9. A third facet was the tacit consent that the 
U.S. Treasury Department afforded to the “theory of misrepresentation” 
sustained by Lavagna facing the actions and declarations made by Director of 
the Western Hemisphere Department of IMF, Anoop Singh, who was intensely 
involved with the future of the Argentinean assets10. 
 However, not only these reasons were related to the American choice to 
lead negotiations between Argentina and the IMF. There were also three 
international issues that U.S. had to bear in mind to increase their participation 
in the talks initiated by the Latin American country in order to reschedule debt 
deadlines. One issue was the fall experienced by stock markets in Chile and 
Mexico in June 2002. Another was linked to Brazil’s stability, as the White 
House supported an IMF loan of 30,000 million to that country in September 
2002, the largest credit ever from the institution, in "support of the economic 
and financial program"11. A third issue, very important indeed, was the pressure 
exerted by Spain and France on the G-7, which softened the U.S. perspective on 
the Argentine default and, in parallel, allowed Lavagna to introduce a political 
                                                 
9 Robert Zoellick, Trade Representative, for example, made clear to Chancellor Carlos Ruckauf that U.S. 
was going to include Argentina in the “Generalized System of Preferences”, which benefited exports to 
the American market through very low duties, or even absence of any tariff.  
10 Singh was alienated from the Argentinean case and replaced by John Thorton. 
11 See IMF Bulletin, v. 31(17). Available at: http://www.imf.org/survey. Accessed March 20, 2009. It is 
also worth reminding that Brazil was in electoral campaign, and that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was 
the most favorite candidate to enter Palácio do Planalto. One must add that not only the U.S. was 
interested in the economic stability, but also France. 





element in the technical atmosphere through which the negotiation of the 
agreement with the IMF was unfolded12. 
 Besides all that has already been stated, there was a very overwhelming 
situation, which was the recovery that Argentina's economy was experiencing 
since 2002 thanks to the growth in world trade operated in the first and third 
quarters of that year. Thereby, U.S. finally interjected for Argentina and the 
IMF to stamp the provisory agreement of January 200313. On the one hand, 
U.S. pushed the international body to postpone the deadlines Argentina carried, 
and, on the other, it pressed the director, Horst Köhler, to isolate the 
bureaucrats from the talks. For Washington the recovery of Argentina's 
economy functioned as a guarantee, while focusing their expectations on the 
next government. Lavagna had succeeded in changing the axis of negotiation 
and simultaneously raised the final restructuring of the foreign debt question in 
other negotiations, under different circumstances, of less vulnerability to 
Argentina (Miranda 2003). 
  
 
The Lavagna-Taylor Axis 
The beginning of the Néstor Kirchner administration, in May 2003, caused a 
positive attitude of the U.S. towards Argentina. If Washington did not know 
the brand new president enough in terms of political experience, the American 
government bet on his assumption since it understood that the end of the 
Argentinean default was more feasible with him. The visit made by Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, to Buenos Aires right after Kirchner entered the Casa 
Rosada was a display of the U.S. political support for Argentina to commit itself 
with IMF in the negotiations for a definite agreement on the reschedule of the 
debt deadlines. In order to make that possible, the White House proposed “a 
                                                 
12 The Spanish and French objectives was about preserving their companies’ interests, which were much 
beneficiated by the 1990s privatizations. 
13 In October 2002, Alan Larson, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agriculture 
Affairs, anticipated the American decision to press IMF for creating a transition program for 
Argentina.  
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cooperative and bilateral relation”, which – concretely – implied on a direct 
backing for Argentina before the international financial organization. 
 Bush did not want complications within the region and sought 
harmonizing its links to it because its agenda was centered in other global areas. 
On the one hand, he met the Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 
Washington in order to ratify once more the historical and strategic alliance 
between the hegemon and its pivot. It was not strange that on the occasion the 
American president stated that Brazil was “an incredibly important part of 
peaceful and prosperous North and South Americas”, thanks to the “increasing 
and vital” relations between both countries. Hence, the White House was not 
strange to the underpinning IMF unreservedly loaned Brazil in 2002, as 
aforementioned. In this case, the U.S. government had no doubts about 
supporting Brazil for its strategic condition. On the other hand, in the frame of 
aiming a harmonic climate within the region, the American support for 
Argentina was also possible because two officers that were reticent on making 
concessions for the Latin American country had left their posts. They were 
O’Neill and the president of the National Economic Council, Lawrence 
Lindsey14. 
 Kirchner’s answer to this new stage opened within bilateral relations 
was opportune. The president of Argentina accepted the maintenance of 
Lavagna in his administration because, among other reasons, it was the 
intention of John Taylor, Undersecretary of the Treasure for International 
Affairs, in order to conserve the negotiation structure that had created the 
provisory agreement of January 2003, and through which a definite partnership 
between Argentina and IMF could be built. Indeed, Taylor only believed in 
Lavagna as a valid interlocutor to deal with the relations between Argentina 
and the international fund. On the other side, the American officer regarded as 
highly favorable the legislative and entrepreneurial support constructed by the 
Argentinean minister during the interim mandate of Duhalde and that 
represented a stronger political solidity than the very president during 
                                                 
14 See Edmund Andrews, “Big Banks Step up Efforts against IMF Debt-Relief Plan”, The New York 
Times, December 19, 2002. 





Kirchner’s outset. It was not everything, however. The Undersecretary of the 
Treasury enormously valued Lavagna’s compromise to start negotiations with 
the private creditors of bonus in default in order to forge a sustainable proposal. 
 This compromise implied that Taylor obtained a good position in the 
debate generated inside IMF concerning the Argentinean case. Moreover, it 
meant a new step backwards for the bureaucrats of the international fund, who 
demanded a technically very severe and long-term agreement, a point 
Argentina could not admit, among other questions. Thus, the Undersecretary of 
the Treasury consolidated his conduction of the Argentina-IMF relations, which 
derived the recognition of the U.S. as the intervening variable in the solution 
for the problems caused by the default of the Latin American country. On the 
other side, to entrust the IMF bureaucracy was a more than important task for 
Lavagna, and only Taylor was able to do that, practically finishing technical 
criteria in the negotiation. 
 During the talks, different questions emerged and they deserve to be 
stressed. One was the power accumulated by the Argentinean Minister of 
Economy  thanks to the political support guaranteed by the Undersecretary of 
the Treasury. For example, he removed the Chancellery from spaces that would 
normally be reserved for it. At the same time, the constraint of the external 
agenda of Argentina because of the debt question erased the importance of 
other topics linked to the foreign relations of the country. However, the most 
relevant fact was the main role played by Lavagna during the negotiations, 
which produced a kind of intragovernmental dispute between him and the 
president of the Central Bank, Alfonso Prat Gray, quickly replaced by Martin 
Redrado in September 2004, and also between the minister and Kirchner, along 
with his Minister of Federal Planning, Julio de Vido. It must be considered that 
Taylor systematically supported the Minister of Economy during this internal 
struggle of the Argentinean administration, which was a substantial backing at 
that time. 
 Another question to be stressed was the international context through 
which Argentina has passed from 2002 onwards, which became favorable. The 
rise of the commodities’ prices, which increased 224% at that year if compared 
to 1972, generated an interesting boost of Argentinean foreign exchanges, which 
contributed, as mentioned before, to a quick recover of the national economy. 
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The exports, which represented roughly US$ 25bi in 2002, leapt up to US$ 30bi 
the following year, mainly through cereals, animal food, seeds, petroleum and 
products, and vegetable oils (Berrettoni and Polonsky 2011). The global 
demand for food, especially for soy, transformed Argentina into an agricultural 
power, positioned as the third soy exporter between 2002 and 2005, behind U.S. 
and Brazil, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
 A third important question is the American intention to consider 
Argentina as a secure ally for themes of U.S interest. Washington thought that 
through facilitating the Argentinean exit from the default, Argentina would 
respond favorably to some requirements made by the White House. For 
example, Bush administration believed that Argentina would support the 
American intervention in Iraq, would accept the Free Trade Agreement for 
Americas, would sustain an eventual military presence of U.S. in the Triple 
Frontier and would start an estrangement from Cuba and, afterwards, 
Venezuela. Things happened the other way, though, and Kirchner dismissed 
every single expectation. After all, and beyond the American decision-makers, 
the only question that worried Taylor was the Argentinean exit from the 





The negotiation showed that its hardcore consisted of the Lavagna-Taylor axis. 
The talks between Kirchner and the IMF bureaucrats was not decisive for the 
negotiation’s developments. The Argentinean president heavily criticized the 
behavior of the international fund during the 1990s until the 2001 crisis, mainly 
because of the erratic and damaging character of this institution towards the 
country. However, Kirchner’s discourse against IMF was directed for domestic 
politics, reason why some analysts and researches of the ex-president’s foreign 
policy hypothesize that this rhetoric was used solely for strengthening its 
government. There was a special reason for this process, which was to bind 
Argentinean society around an assertion that concerned the sovereign zest, thus 
increasing the internal legitimization of the national government after the 
meager electoral results obtained by Kirchner to access Casa Rosada. 





 In spite of the aforementioned motivations, Kirchner’s discourse 
sensitized IMF bureaucrats, especially because the officers faced the obligation 
to preserve decision-spaces that were added to the fund’s structure opposite the 
rulers of the main country-members of the organization. That is the reason why 
the bureaucrats endeavored to contest the discourse that blamed them for the 
Argentinean debacle by minimizing the missteps made as a consequence of the 
application of their policies, even ignoring the support to the Menem and De la 
Rúa administrations. Nonetheless, it was evident that the IMF bureaucracy 
had lost their negotiating spaces to the American government, and Taylor had 
much to do with that in the Argentinean case. With Lavagna he crowned 
coincidences that culminated in the end of a negotiation that IMF had to accept 
without changes15. 
 The aforementioned undersecretary made three practically decisive 
political actions. Firstly, he quickly neutralized the pressure made by some G-8 
governments that sought transmitting their citizens’ demands, creditors of some 
Argentinean bonds in default, mainly Italy, Japan and Germany. In this frame, 
the task accomplished by Lavagna and his Finance Secretary, Guillermo 
Nielson, was of great relevance. Secondly, Taylor achieved an interministerial 
success by making the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, Roger Noriega, attenuate his negative points of view concerning the 
domestic politics of Argentina. Finally yet importantly, Taylor was able to 
silence Krueger, and thus took away her support for the points made by IMF 
bureaucracy, which demanded a strict and technical treatment for the 
Argentinean case. 
 Precisely after getting round the last intent made by the IMF 
bureaucrats concerning the primary surplus and the structural reforms that 
Argentina should put in practice, Taylor and Lavagna signed a three-year 
agreement on refinancing the capital deadlines. It was in September 2003, 
during the annual meeting between IMF and the World Bank that took place in 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Due to this agreement, Argentina could envisage 
                                                 
15 Sebastián López Cóppola, María Cecilia Tossi and Ivana Verdi (2003) understand that Argentina took 
advantage from the use of the reciprocal costs of the interdependent relation with the IMF.  
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an immediate debt of almost US$ 3 bi. The most remarkable point of this 
agreement was yet the IMF’s acceptance on a primary surplus of 3% in terms of 
the GDP, when the bureaucrats’ pretention was of 3.5% in 2004 and 5% in 
2006. 
 Beside the agreement, Argentina made the proposal effective for private 
creditors on the condition that it was possible because of its sustainability. 
Amongst other aspects, the proposal meant that, on the one hand, a debt 
reduction of 75% of the nominal value related to the debt capital in default, and 
on the other, the non-recognition of the due dates of interests payable after 
2002. The Argentinean initiative imitated the differences between Kirchner and 
the IMF. The Argentinean head of state disdained the critiques and pressures of 
the international fund, which tried to bind the refusal of bondholders to the 
Dubai proposal, and whose organizations were not recognized by Buenos 
Aires16. Kirchner did not want to change the proposition because he prioritized 
the domestic politics, especially the institutional stability and the growing 
economy, besides considering that in 2005 medium-term polls would occur and 
test his political legitimacy. 
 Despite its political debilities, IMF wanted to canalize its questions on 
the Argentinean proposal once more, this time through the ministers of Finance 
and Economy of the G-7. For example, the Ministers Meeting of Boca Ratón, 
organized in February 2004, raised the same demands the international fund 
did, that is to say, that Argentina should allow the participation of bondholders 
in the negotiation of bonds in bankruptcy, and also that the country should 
solve the pending structural reforms. In certain moment, the compromise 
between G-7 and IMF menaced the scheme fostered by Buenos Aires and agreed 
on by Taylor. The alliance between the bureaucratic power of the multilateral 
                                                 
16 During the Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank in 
Okinawa, in April 11, 2005, Lavagna pointed out that was impossible to negotiate with “individual 
groups” of bondholders. Furthermore, the round of consultations with them had been very productive 
because, after all, “it was necessary to let the markets speak. And the markets, with more realism than 
the lobby groups, have spoken favorably, with a rate of acceptance of more than 76 percent, higher 
than what collective action clauses require today”. See Roberto Lavagna, “Address by the Governor 
for Argentina at the Third Plenary Session”. Available at: 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=516885. Accessed August 07, 2010. 





organization and the world political power was a bad sign for the conduction 
exerted by the Undersecretary of the Treasury concerning the Argentinean 
default. 
 Regardless of the declarations and intransigencies, Argentina launched 
the trade of bonds without IMF interventions in the beginning of 2005, and 
with a new backing from Taylor, who did not wish for anything else than a 
quick solution of the case17. The agreement between the American 
undersecretary and the Argentinean minister had prevailed, showing that the 
hardcore of the negotiation consisted of both actors. It is worth to mention that 
Lavagna had made some adjustments on which Kirchner did not agree. For 
example, he enhanced the Dubai proposal, recognizing the falling interests since 
2001, which was an incentive for attraction of private creditors. In March 2005, 
the acceptance of the Argentinean proposal had reached almost 77% of the 
total bonds, which surpassed previous expectations. The Argentinean 
government regarded the as highly positive, with aims at re-entering the capital 
markets, which ultimately was the natural objective of solving the default. 
 The differences between Kirchner and the IMF bureaucracy stayed in 
second plan. Lavagna negotiated through political criteria linked to technical 
references, while Taylor sought demonstrating that the Dubai proposal was 
sustainable. Hence, Taylor tranquilized the pressures centered within G-8, 
which represented world politics and the owners of transnational capital. Most 
part of the private creditors could not obtain a better guarantee than the 
backing of an American undersecretary to an offer made by the Argentinean 
minister, obviously. The proposal also eased IMF, which could not oppose the 
stratagem developed by Taylor though this scheme was seen as a defeat by the 
fund’s bureaucracy. The message of the undersecretary to G-8 consisted of 
asking for tolerance on Argentina’s fate because, amongst other reasons, the 
market developments would benefit the proposal made by the Argentinean 
minister. He also added that, on the one hand, Argentina was paying debts to 
IMF, sometimes with reserves from the Central Bank, and on the other, that he 
                                                 
17 We must bear in mind that in the end of September 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) lifted the prohibition for Argentina to operate in the market and, therefore, approved the 
exchange proposal made in Dubai. 
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believed Buenos Aires would deal with points that spurred the international 
fund, such as the tariffs of public services and the primary surplus18. 
 
 
The Frozen Agenda 
After making the trade, the main actors of the negotiation set apart from the 
triangular relations between Argentina, U.S. and IMF. Taylor left the Bush 
administration in April 2005 and Lavagna did the same in Argentina in 
November of the same year. The White House decided to decrease its 
participation in the connections between the Latin American country and the 
international fund. The U.S. regarded its compromise to stop the Argentinean 
default from provoking a generalized regional crisis as deeply fulfilled. The 
Americans understood that the IMF should deal with a smaller problem, like 
the bondholders that withdrew the trade, and the fund should formulate a 
grievance against Argentina as well. For his part, Kirchner personally headed 
the relation with multilateral means of credit once his electoral victory was 
consolidated on the legislative renewal of 2005, proportionating the political 
strength he needed. 
 The relations between Argentina and the IMF did not improve and 
dramatically deteriorated instead19. One question was the issue raised in August 
2004 about the suspension of bilateral talks because of the non-fulfillment of the 
aims fixed by the agreement, and that did not surpass to preserve the trade. 
The struggle between Kirchner and the IMF bureaucracy was revived through 
this topic, from different positions to the ones they had had in the past and 
under a very distinct context, certainly. Nonetheless, the IMF did not cease to 
appeal to the political assistance of the U.S. That is what happened when the 
international fund’s bureaucracy, contrarily to the original intention of the 
                                                 
18 Lavagna indicated such intention when modifying the interest rates for 2005, increasing the 
consolidated primary surplus with the objective to draw near the numbers asked by IMF. It must also 
be mentioned that in September 2004 the risk rating agencies had mentioned that it was necessary to 
increase primary surplus not to be on default once again.  
19 According to José Fernández Alonso (2006, 86), “the policies seeking the normalization of relations 
with global financial agents met an increasing complexity. By then, the limitations of a policy conducted 
by confrontation became evident.” 





American government, pressured the White House for it to demand Argentina a 
peremptory solution for the holdouts, which represented a rough 24% of the 
total amount of bonds in default. 
 Randal Quarles, Undersecretary of Finances of the Treasury 
Department, wanted to resume the role the U.S. used to have on the issue of the 
Argentinean default, but he failed. The American officer intended to create an 
obligation for Argentina to solve the holdouts’ situation before reestablishing a 
positive link to the IMF. In that moment, the expressions used by Lavagna 
during the developments of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, in April 2005, had an enormous weight. In the occasion, 
the Minister of Economy characterized the IMF’s request to solve the 
bondholders issue immediately as discriminatory, when in similar cases the 
negotiations took many years. 
 Besides the suspension of bilateral negotiations because of the non-
fulfillment of the goals fixed by the agreement, another issue marked a 
breakdown in relations between Argentina and the IMF, which were the 
consequent effects of the Casa Rosada’s decision to cancel its obligations with 
the aforementioned fund, in December 2005. In spite of the many critiques by 
the political opposition, disparate from each other in terms of arguments, the 
Argentinean Congress rectified the presidential decision. The payment of almost 
US$ 10 bi in debt was effective for the international organization by enrolling a 
context that other countries, like Russia, Indonesia and Philippines, had also 
been part. Brazil had had an identical initiative days before the Argentinean 
measure, which, according to some versions, were decisions coordinated by Lula 
and Kirchner. For the Argentinean president, the country had achieved the 
“independence from the international organization”. 
 The cancelling of the Argentinean debts with the IMF paradoxically 
meant the freezing of the bilateral agenda between both actors. Some analysts 
had been optimistic when estimating that the differences between Kirchner and 
the IMF bureaucracy would be overcome once the debt was settled. On the one 
hand, such analysts supposed that the IMF would redeem its responsibility for 
the 2001 crisis through this act. On the other, they believed the relief nurtured 
by debt reduction would provide for Argentina an autonomous space to design 
and execute its social and economic policies, as well as to attract investments 
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without the participation of the IMF. However, the disparities persevered to 
such extent that the revision on the Argentinean economy made by the fund in 
July 2006 according to Article IV of the Constitutive Convention of the fund, 
the first since the cancellation of the debts, never happened again. Furthermore, 
the freezing of the Argentina-IMF agenda had a ricochet effect on the relations 
between Argentina and the U.S. What could be transmitted to Argentina by the 




The non-adaptation of Argentina to the IMF patrons, the same which 
contributed to what ended up as the 2001 crisis, meant that the relations 
between the country and financial issues was made without the participation of 
this international fund, and this place was directly occupied by the U.S. The 
latter country kept the political role played when dealing with the default until 
a big part of the debt problem was solved. However, the position of the 
American government before Argentina changed from a collaborative into a 
litigant one, demanding the solution of issues as the negotiation with the 
private creditors that did not enter the bond exchanges of 2005, in spite of the 
Quarles’ failure. 
 Because of Buenos Aires’ resistance, Washington kept prioritizing its 
strategic interests that were the axis of Argentina’s structural dependence to the 
U.S. Notwithstanding the many coincidences between the actors in different 
issues of the bilateral agenda, the U.S. government limited the external actions 
of Argentina, which was recovering economically and achieving institutional 
stability. A prove of the American restrictions was the penalization of 
Argentina through obstacles to its access to the transnational circuit of 
investments, which turned out to be a reinforcement of the country’s isolation 
from the international financial market. When Argentina rightly believed that 
debt relief was going to give the country a stronger economic freedom, the 
hegemon – in name of the international financial system – reduced its margin of 
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On December 2001, due to the financial crisis, Argentina had to suspend 
external payments. The country started a frantic process of abandonment of 
default thereafter. Research about the causes, processes and mechanisms of the 
crisis has focused on economic issues. The present work instead considers 
international politics. The aim of the paper is to analyze the role of the United 
Sates in the restructuring of Argentina’s debt. We consider the reasons, 
conditions, and actions developed by the hegemonic power in the relationship 
between Argentina and its creditors. We specially emphasize the political role 
played by the U.S. government, a position that the U.S. administration had no 
intention to assume neither before the debacle nor after the crisis started. We 
conclude that, despite the fact that Argentina has overcome the most difficult 
part of its default, the episode made evident, once more, the strong Argentine 
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